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FORUM
Denver International Airport: Lessons Learned

C . Daniel Prather

"Xhe airport planner, who is required to anticipate conditions 10 to 15years in thefuture, must often resort to
guesswork " (322).
Researching the evolution of Denver International Alrport was more than simply a project of interest. These three
authors recognize the continuing growth in aviation demand and the need for expanding facilities to accommodate this
demand. Indeed, this book was designed to assist major cities worldwide as they are forced to cope with this need for
additional supply in airport facilities. In sum, "the need to build new airports and expand existing ones will continue to
press communities to address many of the same difficult questions that Denver f a d (ix).In this sense, this book is a
resource for all airport managers and professors confronting the increasing aviation demands of the next millennium.
Chapter one, entitled "The world's largest airport," points
out that Denver International Anport (DM)is the largest
segment of real estate in the world solely dedicated to
commercial aviation. Prior to developing this 52 square mile
facility, however, six alternate sites were evaluated. This
chapter details the political struggle among municipal
officials, airport officials, and citizens during consideration of
alternative sites. After many campaigns both pro and con,an
election was held on May 16, 1989, which resulted in a 63
percent victory far the new airport. Although thisvote was not
legally required, City of Denver Mayor Pena decided he
"could not deny citizens the right to vote on the largest public
works project in the city's historyy'(16). Construction began
on September 28, 1989, with the airport finally opening
February 28, 1995. The entire project was finalized at $3.5
billion over budget.
Chapter two, "Three hubs to one: the folly of forecasting in
the dynamic airline industry," attempts to answer questions
such as (1) how are forecastsof passenger demand generated?
(2) why are these so erroneous? (3) how have recent policy
changes, such as airline deregulation, affected airport
development? and (4) given the shortcomings of existing
forecasting practices, what kind of planning process is the
most effective? Specifically,the chapter points out that issues
such as deregulation, globalization, capacity, and delay have
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made the practice of aviation forecasting a spotty effort at
best. Ths however, should be no surprise to students of
statistical forecasting methods. The numbers produced are
only as accurate as the variables considered, and because of
this, predicting the future, whether involving the stock market
or airline passengers, is a complex endeavor.
This is not to say that these inaccurate forecasts must simply
be accepted, however. In fact, these inaccurate forecasts at
Denver proved 'Wdlyoptimistic" (xii). In the late 1980s,the
FAA projected that Denver would ultimately see 55 million
passengers by 1995; the actual number was less than 31
million. This, of course, played a role into how large the new
airport needed to be, and in fact, if a new airport was even
necessary.
Completing chapter two is the first in a series of "lessons
learned." These points are presented at the end of each
remaining chapter to drive home points that should be learned
from DM'S experiences. Some of the lessons learned from
this chapter include (1) not relying exclusively on aviation
forecasts; they will nearly always be wrong, (2) not
overlooking alternative methods of resolving capacity
problems, and (3) fully considering the role of airlines in any
further forecasting exercises.
Chapter three, "The politics of DIA's development,"
discusses an issue that is present in all public agencies.
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Specifcally, the following questions are addressed: (1) How
effective are existing mechanisms for public participation in
the planning process? (2) What responsibility do the media,
elected officials, and planners have to ensure that the public is
accurately informed about the issues? and (3) How does a city
secure cooperation with other relevant organizations in airport
development or expansion?
In answering these questions, this chapter presents a caseby-case analysis of each of the following actors involved in
the process: elected officials, local businesspeople, the
citizenry, and various interest groups. Regarding public
participation, the authors list four levels at which public
participation can take place: (1) ''tokenism" in which power
resides with elected O M S ,(2) "consultation," which allows
citizens the opportunity to comment via public hearings,
surveys, and advisory committees; however, officials still
make the decisions, (3) "reconciliatory" in which there is a
strong two-way flow of information between the decisionmakers, the public, and various community-based groups;
however, the governmental agency retains the decisionmaking power, and (4) the "participatory" model in which
power is shared by the public and the government. This last
model allows the public to participate in the actual decisionmaking process at the policy level.
Some lessons learned include: (1) citizen education and
participation is essential from the outset if public support is to
be long-lived and democratic values respected, (2) the media
must remain an independent source of reliable, unbiased
information about major infi-cture
issues facing their
community, (3) local proponents or opponents must be
unilied, well-financed, and posses politically astute leadership,
and (4) opponents of airport expansion can play a trump card
with the threat of environmental opposition. Regarding the
second lesson, the authors candidly stated "had [the media]
been more vigilant as the public's watchdog, the project
would likely have been implemented far more successfully
than it was" (134).
Chapter four specifically analyzes the economic impact of
airports. Indeed, airports have been recognized as possibly the
single most important piece of irdkastructure cities and nations
can build to improve their chances of success in global
economic competition. However, the authors quickly argue
that '"the economic impact argument alone cannot be used as
the principaljustification for building new airports" (140). In
discussing the impact of these projects, a historical review of
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Denver is performed dating back to its founding in 1858.
Current impacts are also discussed, such as the estimate that
one in every ten jobs Colorado-wide is airport-related. The
chapter also discusses competing airports, such as Colorado
Springs and their hub airline, Western Pacific. In addition,
local land-use impacts are evaluated, such as the one main
entrance into DIA, Pena Boulevard. Further, the authors state
"what now is open farmland or rangeland is expected to
become the site of billions of dollars in residential and
commercial development over the next 10 to 20 years" (171).
Lessons learned include (1) airports are not a panacea for
lagging economic development, (2) land-use planning around
airports should be coordinated and consistent among affected
jurisdictions, and (3) insurmountable barriers to residential
development should be placed near airports.
Chapter five, "Financing the field of dreams," is perhaps
reminiscent of familiar megaprojects in the past. Whether an
airport, or a dream, this project had to be financed. This
chapter discusses methods by which both international and
U.S. airports are financed. Indeed, the International Air
Transport Association (IATA) and the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) estimate that, worldwide, $250
billion will be spent for airports between now and 2010 (183).
Due to the magnitude of these projects and the continued
declining federal funding, this chapter is of importance to
many in the industry today.
The chapter begins by discussing the financing process at
airports worldwide. Bonds (both revenue and general
obligation), underwriters, rating agencies, and privatization
are a few of the concepts discussed in the first section of this
chapter. The next section looks specifically at DIA's case.
DIA was h c e d with approximately $3.5 billion in bond
sales, along with federal fimds, monies h m the disposition of
Stapleton, a capital fund, 1985 project accounf PFCs, and a
civil aviation fuel tax. With this substantial amount of bonds
outstanding, debt service expense for DIA climbed to $344.5
million per year. This, even though revenues were projected
at $431.8 million in 1995. It is obvious, therefore, that bonds
make up a large portion of DIA's financing base and even
more of their annual expenses.
The next section of chapter five discusses the politics of
underwriting. Denver received the dubious honor of earning
the lowest grade ever assigned to the bonds of a major U.S.
airport. This was due in part to continued opening delays,
escalating change orders, and the infamous automated
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baggage system. Speaking of the volatility of the airport itself,
and thus the bonds' behavior, one analyst noted, "if you don't
like volatility, you don't like these bonds" (2 12). Because of
this volatility, complaints and lawsuits have resulted, one
(Rabinowitz v. City of Denver et al. 1995) charging that " . .
. [official DL4 bond statements] failed to fdly and adequately
disclose the risks associated with investing in the Bonds"
(214). These problems led the city auditor to remark, "I never
dreamed that when the airport was completed that we would
exchange construction workers for lawyers" (215).
Another clear example of the politics associated with bond
underwriting, appears when MarkAir, a bankrupt air carrier,
requested a the-year, $30 million loan fiom the city prior to
commencing operations in Denver. Upon hearing this,
Moody's told Denver that if it approved this loan to MarkAir,
the ratings on DIA's bonds would be dropped to junk bond
status. This threat was s~ltFcientto bring negotiations to a halt
even though the traveling public of Colorado might have
benefited from a more competitive airline environment at
DM.
Lessons learned Itom this chapter appear to be common
knowledge. They are as follows: (1) honesty is the best policy,
(2) act ethically, (3) subject bond underwriters to the same
competitivebidding process as other city contractors, and (4)
keep the cornunity fully informed of all financial
developments.
Chapter six evaluates the site selection process. This, as all
airport managers know, is one of the most M c u l t decisions
concerning new airport development. Complex factors
involved in this process include environmental constraints,
noise, compatible land use, distance &om city center, and
ground access. Regarding distance from city center, it should
be noted that newer airports are always being built farther
away from the city simply due to the lack of available land
near the city. On that note, Denver is 24 miles from
downtown. Stapleton was a mere 7 miles.
This chapter also discusses the Environmental Impact
Statement @IS) process. Noted environmental impacts
produced by airports include noise, air quality, water quality,
impacts on wildlife, and social impacts such as relocation of
households.Interestingly enough, even though D M was built
far way from the downtown, and on relatively vacant
rangeland, 277 noise complaints were registered during the
first week of DM'S operation. By December 2, 1995, D M
had received a total 66,742 noise complaints, compared with

cmly 43 1 at Stapleton during all of 1994. Several reasons for

this astounding number are (1) that some residential areas
were actually within the 65Ldn contour even though original
projections indicated they would not be, (2) the final EIS was
based on six runways, rather than the five that were built, and
(3) each household making complaints is averaging nearly 20
calls. In fact, ten familes account for one-fourth of all
complaints (259).
Lessons learned in chapter six address several aspects of the
site selection process. They include locating the airport to
minimize adverse noise impacts, developing and
implementingnoise mitigation procedures in consultation with
affected publics, monitoring the validity of the noise impact
forecasts, incorporating multi-modal ground access into the
termma1 airport, developing a comprehensive intermodal and
multi-modal transportation hub, air quality impact being
considered for an entire region, and site selection processes
that are open to the public.
The next chapter, chapter seven, discusses airj?ort layout,
design, and technologies. This third phase of an airport's
master plan is broken down into four components: (1) airport
layout (2) land use, (3) terminal area, and (4) airport access.
The chapter begins by discussing the effects of airline
deregubon on airport layout. Regarding DIA's master plan,
it calls for 12 runways surrounding four (or five) center-field
60-gate air side terminal buildings linked to a landside
terminal building (with five modules at full build out) by a
5100-foot underground train. When ultimately built out
(sometime after the year 2020), DIA's capacity would be 110
million passengers (compared with about 3 1 million in 1995)
and 1.23 million operations annually. This, the text notes, is
more capacity than any other airport in the world (291).
Some interestmg points about DM include the following: (1)
to flatten the site of DIA, about 110 d o n cubic yards of
earth were moved, which is about one-third the amount moved
to build the Panama Canal, (2) the FAA reconfigured 240,000
square miles of navigable airspace to accommodate the flight
paths of the new airport; (3) even with high density altitude,
Asia will be within reach from Denver once the new 16,000
feet m w a y is built; (4) the 327-foot FAA control tower is the
tallest in the world; (5) no runways intersect; and (6) DL4 is
one of only four airports in the U.S. with an advanced airport
lighting system. Technologies discussed include the radar,
communications system, people movers, baggage system,
security, aud those technologies implemented to combat snow
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and ice problems.
One situation that results in problems and complaints at DIA
is the fact that even though United Airlines utilizes DIA as a
hub airport, the airport itself sees Origin and Destination
traff~cof 58 percent, with connecting tr&c of 42 percent.
Therefore, this airport is being forced to accommodate both
O&D and transfer passengers. This, as one can imagine, is
difficult to accomplish. For these reasons, the following
conflicts have been noted: (1) baggage claim level is
accessible only to public transport and not private autos, (2)
to get fiom the parking garage to the drop-off or pick-up
levels, or vice versa, automobiles must drive three miles
around to return to the terminal area, (3) the public accessed
the airport during the first year without the convenience of a
gas station on the 12-mile Pena Boulevard, (4) with only two
lanes in each direction, Pena Boulevard can become quite
congested, and (5) no snow fences were originally built to
protect the boulevard from blowing snow. The chapter
continues by discussing several technological problems
encountered during the first year of DIA's operation and how
similar problems are being handled at other new airports
throughout the world.
In addition, this chapter delves into the many technological
breakthroughs attempted at DIA. As a result of this, many
lessons were learned: (1) acquire as much land as possible at
the outset, (2) design the airfield first, (3) decisions made to
enhance hubbing efficiency may compromise 0&D
convenience,(4) design terminals and concourses in modular
f m with sufficient reserved space to allow future expansion,
(5) get the principal airline tenants and the national
government involved early in the design process, (6)
incoprate security concerns into airport planning and design
early, (7) locate the airport to minimize adverse noise impacts,
(8) incoqxmte mass transit into the terminal design, (9) adopt
a proven technology for critical systems (keep it simple,
stupid), and (10) set aside ample time to test-run the
technology.
Chapter eight focuses on the architecture and aesthetics of
the airport. First, the white multi-peaked roof is the initial
impression one has when driving to the airport. This design
has been praised by some, such as " . . . [the fabric peaks]
create a mood of excitement and adventure that is inseparable
f h n travel but virtually absent from modern airports" (36 I),
and criticized by others, such as
" . . . [it looks like] a circus tent draped over a big hedgehog"

(361). The terminal itself covers 3.5 million square feet - the
equivalent of 35 football fields. The parking garages were
"merc*
tucked below the roof line as not to obstruct the
view fiom the west side of the departure level" (372). From
the main observation deck however, the view of most of the
mountains (withthe exception of Pike's Peak) is obstructed by
a highway viaduct leading up to the top level. And the latter,
according to one critic, is "unforgivable' (373).
Due to a demand by ContinentalAirlines' Frank Lorenzo, the
main terminal and Concourse " A are connected by the only
bridge crossing an active airport taxiway in the world. In
addition, Denver decided to incorporate artwork into the
termmal to showcase local &and the surrounding region.
Although the authors note that beauty is in the eye of the
beholder, one critic found only "[flive truly first-rate pieces
fiom a budget of more than $7 million" (380). Prior to the
conclusion of this chapter, the authors also focus on
architecture and aesthetics of other major international
airports. Some lessons learned fiom this chapter include: (1)
art should be incorporated into the budget, (2) the art should
reflect the unique cultural heritage and natural beauty of the
region served by the airport, and (3) tasteful art should be
selected by art experts, with the public then choosing from a
group of finalists.
Chapter nine, "How did a $1.5 billion airport become a $5.3
billion airport?", summarizes the many dSiculties
encountered in building DIA, which resulted in substantial
delays and massive cost overmns. The authors quickly point
out that Denver is similar to megaproject peers in that
megaprojects cost, on average, 90 to 150 percent more than
their ori@ estimates. Along these lines, the authors present
a conceptual model of cost growth that defines four basic
factors: (1) cost-estimating errors, (2) faulty project
execution, (3) changes in project, and (4) changes in project
macro-environment. Regarding cost, in comparative terms,
Stapleton cost less than $6 per passenger, whereas DIA cost
over $18 per passenger. This led then Colorado governor Roy
Romer to declare, "Had somebody told me that the perpassenger cost was going to be $18, I would not have
supported the airport . . . . They went Cadillac" (410).
Regardingthe routmg of 12-milePena Boulevard, the reason
it is shaped as an inverted "I,"rather than a straight diagonal
line is a mystery. In fact, if a modest two miles had been
shaved off the driving distance, auto emissions would have
been reduced by more than one million kilograms of carbon
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monoxide annually, thus saving two million gallons of
gasoline per year (4 13).
Faulty project execution resulted form the fast-track
approach. The City teamed with Greiner/MomsonKnudsen,
a joint venture, to coordinate and ensure the quality of 61
design contracts, 134 construction contractors, and more than
2,000 subcontractors(417). This led one auditor to state "that
DIA is a project out of control and without leadership" (418).
Regarding design changes, the dominant hub carriers at
Stapleton, at first, had no support for a new airport that may
give rise to a new, competitive hub airline. However, once
they agreed, they demanded - and received - significant and
expensive design changes. Mayor Webb, who was eager to
f5is.h the new airport, readily acceded to their demands. As a
result, Continental's changes added $200 million to DIA's
costs, while United added $600 million. Continental, in the
meantime, fell into Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Ultimately, the
City realized that Continental would occupy only 3 or 4 gates
of a 20 gate concourse that had been built specifically for it.
Page 430 of the text presents a very sobering chart displaying
the amount of change orders as opening day drew closer. The
most expensive, issued in March 1994, was a change order in
the amount of $535 million.
The next section in this chapter discusses the "baggage
system fimn hell." Indeed, with the exception of this system,
the airport may have opened one year earlier. Although many
know of the problems with this system, many don't know that
United actually demanded it; therefore, it was not in the
original specifications for the airport. There were two
conditions for this project which successful bidders had to
adhk to: (1) the system had to be complete in 26 months and
(2) it had to move 1,000 bags per minute. Two bids were
submitted and both were rejected due to bulky equipment and
untimely project completion. The City then turned to BAE
Automated Systems, Inc., which agreed to complete the
system in two years, provided it had unlimited access to the
facility. However, delays resulted due to the City's failure to
allow primary and expeditious access to BAE. Desperate to
open the airport, the City signed away its rights to sue BAE
for producing a dysfunctional baggage system by the
scheduled opening date. Further, another company was
commissioned to build a backup system comprised of
com~eymbelts and natural gas-fueled tugs and carts. In all, the
City spent nearly $300 million for baggage handling for an
airport with fewer than 90 gates.

The next section candidly discusses problems with the
management at DIA. From the governor on down, it seems
that very few escape the authors' criticism. With section
headings such as "Imprudent cost-cutting," "Ethics: Greed,
cronyism, and revolving doors," and "Send lawyers, guns, and
money," it is obvious that many unethical practices were
commonplace at DM and the City. Nonetheless, the
unavoidableproblems probably produce empathy by some in
the industry. Indeed, "DIA was planned for three major hub
airlines (United, Continental, and Frontier), built for two
(United and Continental), and is occupied by only one
(united)" (455).
Many lessons were also learned in chapter nine. Some of
these include: (1) make every effort to get the principal
tenants on board early in the planning and design process to
minimize scope and design changes, (2) resist major scope
changes after construction has begun, and if they must be
made, amend the timetable for opening the airport
accordingly, (3) install backup systems, (4) depoliticize the
contractiugprocess, and (5) promulgate a vigorous regime of
ethical regulation and enforce it.
Chapter ten, "Auport planning theory in perspective,"
focuses on implications for those interested specifically in
airport projects and generally in megaproject planning and
decision-making. This chapter begins by presenting various
theories decision-making that have been advanced in the past.
The authors point out that "at best,the rational comprehensive
model represents only an ideal form of how planning and
decision-making is supposed to occur7' (472). The authors
then delve into the character of Denver's airport planuing
process. From problem conceptualization to project
implementation, all five stages of this process are analyzed.
The chapter then moves into a more thorough discussion of
these processes and models. In sum,the authors suggest that
the planning of airports and other magaprojects be
approached from a paradigm that recognizes the great
uncertainties that are inherent in such endeavors. In their
words, "one must be prepared to deal with the totally
unexpected" (485). Lessons learned from this chapter include
the following: (1) efficiency should not be defined in narrow
economic terms, (2) develop mechanisms to promote
community consensus on critical choices, (3) develop
arrangements to force careful public discussions of the
project's assumptions, (4) develop a new approach to airport
planning that recognizes the importance of maintaining
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flexibihty throughout the process, and (5) promote the
development of organizationsthat are prepared and equipped
to deal with risks and uncertainties.
The final chapter of this book, entitled "What have we
leamedr', presents many facts which all airport planners and
managers should review. In m e r i n g the question, "Why did
DIA cost so much?", the following points are presented: (1)
Mayor Pena's decision to break the airport into a large
number of small contracts, (2) the excessive time consumed
between the decision to build and the land acquisition, (3)
Mayor Pena's decision to sign numerable contracts on the eve
of his departure to put the project beyond the "point of no
return,'' (4) Mayor Webb's capitulation to the airlines' belated
demands for massive scope changes, (5) Webb's decision to
expand the automated baggage system beyond United's
Concourse B to cover all three concourses, (6) Webb's focus
on securing contracts for his fiiends and supporters, rather
than focusing on more crucial airport issues, and (7) the
failure of the federal government to provide adequate
oversight (500-0 1).
Turning to the fact that no new major airports (prior to DIA)
have been buitt in the U.S. in two decades, the authors attempt
to explain how Denver was able to do it. They outline three
major factors: (1) growth impetus, which grew out of the
desire to reinvigorate the local economy in the 1980s, (2)
willing politicians, such as the mayor and governor who saw
a new airport a s a way to achieve their political goals while at
the same time alleviating the worsening problems of capacity
and noise at Stapleton, and (3) favorable external
c i r c ~ c e ssuch
, as Stapleton being recognized as a key
bottleneck and the subsequent strong federal support,
disorganized airlines who opposed the new airport, and the
medq interest pups, and general public who were unwilling
or unable to halt the project.
The h
llist of lessons learned somewhat summarizes many
of the concepts learned throughout the text and include the

following: (1) despite all obstacles, a major American city
with determined political leadership, a strong growth
coalition, and a favorable economic environment can build a
transportation, (5) don't believe the overly optimistic
projections of demand and cost, (6) airline deregulation has
created tremendous uncertainty for airport planners, (7) the
federal government should take a stronger role in protecting
competitors and consumers from the predatory and
monopolistic pricing and other practices, respectively, of
dominant airlines at concentrated hub airports, (8) politicians
are essential for building political consensus, but they often
feel compelled to reward their supporters, (9) aflkmative
action can be used to mask political cronyism, (10) new
approachesto airport design and implementation are required,
(11)intermodal tramportation access, while carefully planned
in foreign countries, is unfortunately a low priority in the U.S.,
and (12) federal and local governments should help facilitate
airport growth and development and the more efficient use of
existing airway and airport capacity.
To smnmarize, the book by Dempsey, Goetz, and Szyliowicz
takes a profound look on the effects of airport development in
the U.S. Rather than simply analyzing the problems and
successes experienced by DIA since its inception, these
auhm take a longitudinal look at the City of Denver from its
founding until tbe present. Stapleton w o r t is discussed quite
heavily as this airport and its capacity constraints were the
impetus in the decision to build DIA.
I believe this book is an extremely informative aid for
students, professors, and professionals in thisindustry. It is
a large text and can become rather technical at times, but
students and professors alike will find the events discussed in
this book quite informative. It is indeed a must-read for
academicians interested in increasing their knowledge about
real-world examples of the airport business. Learning from
past practice is but one way in which the airport industry will
continue to grow and prosper in the coming miUenium.0
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